DPRK's Offensive Cyber Capability

- tactics/technology change in 2012-2013 -

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RQ and Analytic Framework

- To measure DPRK's offensive cyber capability, capacity. Especially on how Techniques-Tactics -Procedures has been changed?
- Analytic Framework

  Tri-layered Model

  – Incident Layer: observed, detected attack
  – Tech Layer: development, infrastructure
  – Policy/Strategy area: Key strategic decision(s)

DPRK activity on Incident Layer



Key Findings

- Offensive cyber capability development is consistent since from 2009.
- shift in the motivation of attacks.
  - Financially motivated attack are seen only after late 2014.
  - From sabotage to espionage.

on Tech Layer



Key Findings

- Offensive capability could date back to 2009.
- Very few activities/capabilities from early 2012 to end of 2014.
- China has lost their critical influence over DPRK Cyber activities.

on Policy/Strategy layer



Key Findings

- Power vacuum in around 2012
- Amount of Arms export have been increasing. $30M-50M(2016)

Working Hypothesis need to look further

- Strategy change around 2012-2013 indicates
  A) Undetected, unreported DRPK attack.
  B) Malware development process has changed due to leadership change in military.
  C) Power game after Jong-il's death disturb on the ground operation.
  D) DPRK got new mentor/supporter.

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